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A Feminist Human Rights Perspective on the Use of Internal Relocation by 
Asylum Adjudicators 
     
 
Nora Honkala 
 
My first encounter with Professor Sandy Ghandhi was as a Masters student on his 
module on international human rights. Indeed, it was his module. This is not just a 
cliché but also one that is demonstrative of his relentless belief in human rights being 
the idea of our time.  Sandy taught the module inspirationally, seamlessly pulling 
together the immensity of theory and practice concerning the field, making it not only 
educational but also thoroughly enjoyable.  
 
Sandy’s exceptional experience, intellectual rigour and capacity for hard work are often 
modestly hidden behind his casual charm and wit. As my supervisor and mentor, Sandy 
never waned in his enthusiasm for engaging with justice, finding words of 
encouragement during my moments of despair; and, most of all, for giving me the space 
to make up my own mind. Indeed, I am fortunate to have begun my academic career 
under Sandy’s mentorship. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Women’s refugee claims often concern complex human rights violations that 
necessitate a nuanced interpretation and application of refugee law. The United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) offers guidance to adjudicators to take a 
liberal and humanitarian spirit in light of the object and purpose of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. In this chapter, I examine the jurisprudence from two appeal level 
decisions FB (Lone Women-PSG-internal relocation- AA (Uganda) considered) Sierra 
Leone [2008] UKAIT 00090 and HC & RC (Trafficked Women) China CG [2009] 
UKAIT 00027. In both cases the adjudicators found persecution within the meaning of 
the Refugee Convention, but dismissed the appeals based on the availability of an 
internal relocation option. In this chapter I seek to critique the adjudicators reasoning 
with regards to the internal relocation option and argue that this reasoning evidences a 
problematically restrictive application of refugee law and process. It is argued that these 
two cases evidence that gendered assumptions mean that the reasoning do not take 
adequately into account the socio-legal realities of the nature of the asylum seeker 
women’s human rights violations. As such, the chapter concludes that the interpretation 
of the law evident in these decisions falls short of the standard of taking into account 
the overall object and purpose of the Convention, as well as the general human rights 
context. What is proposed is to seriously engage with the feminist critiques in order to 
understand the discrimination that such an approach can cause. 
 
 
2. International Refugee Law Framework  
 
The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1968 Protocol form 
the foundations on the international refugee protection regime. Today, the Convention 
has 145 State party signatories and remains the sole international legally binding 
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instrument that gives protection to refugees. The definition of refugee contained in the 
Convention is one of the most widely accepted international norms and one that has 
also made its way into public consciousness.1 Even though the Refugee Convention 
and its Protocol does not require the definition to be adopted by States, many States 
employ its definition in their domestic asylum systems.2 
 
The 1951 Convention defines a refugee as a person who: 
“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having 
a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a 
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it”.3 
 
When a State makes a refugee status determination, the asylum seeker must prove that 
she has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of one or more of the 
enumerated Convention Grounds; race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion. Persecution must be shown. A commonly 
accepted method is to show this by ‘serious harm’ and ‘failure of state protection’.4 It 
is important to remember that the object and purpose of the Refugee Convention is 
humanitarian. As stated in its preamble, the goal of the Convention is to “assure 
refugees the widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms” 
“without discrimination”. 
 
Of importance to many women’s claims is the particular ways in which international 
refugee law is applied that has gendered consequences for their claims. Although 
women can of course suffer from same kinds of persecution as men, there is evidence 
that women have been unable to benefit equally from the protection afforded by the 
Refugee Convention. 5  Women’s claims thus necessitate an understanding of the 
particular implications of gender in relation to their claims. There can be said to be two 
main ways in which women may not be afforded equal treatment under the Refugee 
Convention; first; that the interpretation of the Convention marginalises women’s 
experiences, and second, that procedural and evidential barriers can decrease the quality 
of the decision-making process.6 This Chapter is concerned with the first obstacle.7 
 
 
 
 
1 Daniel J. Steinbock: “The Refugee Definition as Law: Issues of Interpretation” in Refugee Rights and 
Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes, Frances Nicholson and Patrick Twomey  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 13- 36 at 13. 
2 James C. Hathaway: “A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premises of Refugee Law” Harvard 
International Law Journal 31 (1990): 129. 
3 Art 1 A (2) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951. 
4 Hathaway, “A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premises of Refugee Law”, supra note 2, at 129. 
5 Heaven Crawley: Refugees and Gender: Law and Process (Bristol: Jordans, 2011), 5. 
6 Ibid. 
7 For thorough investigation into quality of initial decision-making in the UK, including the procedural 
barriers, see Helene Muggeridge and Chen Maman. “Unsustainable: The Quality of Initial Decision-
Making in Women’s Asylum Claims,” Asylum Aid. January 2011, last accessed 20.1.2014, 
http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/unsustainableweb.pdf. 
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3. Feminist Engagement with International Refugee Law 
 
The problems with the interpretation of the Refugee Convention stem from the fact that 
the Convention remains deeply rooted in its history. At the time of the drafting of the 
Convention, the relevance of gender was only discussed once.8 The Yugoslav delegate 
proposed that the category “sex” be included in the Convention Article 3 which states 
that the Convention shall be applied “without discrimination as to race, religion or 
country of origin”.9 However, this suggestion was rejected as the feeling at the time 
was that “the equality of the sexes was a matter for national legislation” as stated by 
the British delegate. 10  The Chairman of the drafting conference, the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees Van Heuven Goedhart strongly doubted whether there 
would ever be any cases on account of sex.11 Refugee women remained mostly invisible 
until the 1980s. 
 
It was largely due to NGOs, feminist activists and academics that this invisibility of 
women asylum seekers was exposed and brought to the agenda. Feminists have indeed 
been criticising the supposed gender neutrality of the refugee definition since the 
1980s.12 The ways in which the Refugee Convention has been interpreted, particularly 
in Western industrialised States have been heavily influenced by the historical context 
of the Refugee Convention. The model of the Convention refugee definition is a single, 
male, political exile, who was considered to be the main casualty of the Cold War era.13 
Many women’s claims do not fit this model and the fact that gender is not included as 
a Convention ground has created debate. Feminists like Jane Freedman have argued 
that the absence of gender as a sixth category has meant that gender- related persecution 
has been trivialised and demonstrates that it has not been taken as seriously as other 
forms of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality or political opinion.14 On 
the other hand, it has also been argued that a separate category might lead all 
persecution done to women to be thought in a single category, leading to perceptions 
that women’s persecution was always something fundamentally different than that of 
men, and by inference perhaps something less important.15 It is generally accepted, 
however that the international climate is not conducive for the expansion of the refugee 
definition by way of including gender as a sixth category.16 It is therefore imperative 
that the refugee convention is interpreted in a manner that is inclusive and gender 
sensitive. For instance, Bhabha, Crawley and Goldberg have all argued for a more 
inclusive approach to defining what constitutes as persecution.17 The problem then is 
 
8 Thomas Spijkerboer: Gender and Refugee Status (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 1. 
9 Thomas Spijkerboer: Gender and Refugee Status, supra note 8, at 1. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Doreen Indra: “Gender: A Key Dimension of the Refugee Experience” Refuge 6 (1987) 3, Jacqueline 
Greatbatch: “The Gender Difference: Feminist Critiques of Refugee Discourse” International Journal 
of Refugee Law 1 (1989): 517. 
13 Jacqueline Bhabha, and Sue Shutter: Women’s Movement: Women under Immigration, Nationality 
and Refugee Law (London: Trentham Books, 1994). 
14 Jane Freedman: Gendering the International Asylum and Refugee Debate (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), 75. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Emily Copeland: “A Rare Opening in the Wall: The Growing Recognition of Gender-Based 
Persecution” in Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees and Human Rights in the 21st Century 
Niklaus Steiner et al. (London: Routledge, 2003): 101-116, 101. 
17 Jacqueline Bhabha: “Boundaries in the Field of Human Rights” Harvard Human Rights Journal 15 
(2002): 155, Heaven Crawley: “Engendering the State in Refugee Women’s Claims for Asylum” in 
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not the Convention definition but the way in which women’s experiences are actually 
“represented and analytically characterised”.18 The cases of FB (Sierra Leone) and HC 
& RC (China) both show how the Adjudicators use restrictive interpretation of the 
internal relocation principle and ignore the socio-legal realities of the women’s 
experiences. 
 
 
4. Gender and Internal Relocation Option 
 
“A loved child has many names”19 
 
Internal relocation, internal protection, internal flight alternative, internal flight option, 
internal relocation option all refer to a state created legal concept that in the 1980s 
quickly rose to become a stable hurdle in the refugee determination process. Although 
through varied tests, states around the world have embraced the internal relocation 
option as a mechanism to deny and restrict international protection to asylum seekers. 
Because women’s asylum claims are more likely than men’s to involve non-state agent 
persecution, women are disproportionally affected by the application of internal 
relocation option. 
 
While the origins of the internal relocation option are not clear, what is often referenced 
is the UNHCR Handbook. UNHCR in 1979 provided the following instructions: 
“The fear of being persecuted need not always extend to the whole territory of 
the refugee’s country of nationality. Thus in ethnic clashes or in cases of grave 
disturbances involving civil war conditions, persecution of a specific ethnic or 
national group may occur in only one part of the country. In such situations, a 
person will not be excluded from refugee status merely because he could not 
have sought refuge in another part of the same country, if under all the 
circumstances it would not have been reasonable to expect him to do so.”20 
 
It is evident from the instruction that it was meant to deter States from excluding 
persons from refugee status merely because they could have sought internal protection 
elsewhere within the country. 21  However, States have since the 1980s used this 
instruction very restrictively, if not in bad faith. States have interpreted the instruction 
to mean that exclusion from refugee status may be justified and that the inquiry could 
include a retrospective analysis (ie. whether the asylum seeker could have sought refuge 
in another part of the same country). 22  UNHCR has subsequently issued further 
 
States of Conflict: Gender Violence and Resistance, Susie M. Jacobs et al. (New York: Zed Books, 
2000), Heaven Crawley: Gender and Refugees: Law and Process, supra note 5, Pamela Goldberg: 
“Anyplace but Home: Asylum in the United States for Women Fleeing Intimate Violence” Cornell 
International Law Journal 26 (1993): 565. 
18 Heaven Crawley: “Gender, Persecution and the Concept of Politics in the Asylum Determination 
Process” Forced Migration Review 9 (2000): 17,19. 
19 Scandinavian proverb. 
20 UNHCR. Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Reedited January1992, UNHCR, 
1979, UN Doc. HCR/IP/Eng/REV.1., para 91. (Emphasis added). 
21 James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster: “Chapter 6.1: Internal Protection/Relocation/Flight 
Alternative as an Aspect of Refugee Status Determination” in Refugee Protection in International Law; 
UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection, Erika Feller et al. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003): 357- 417, 361.  
22 Ibid, 362. 
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instructions to States in the application of a two-stage test, first on the “relevance 
analysis” and then on the “reasonableness analysis”.23 But as much as UNHCR has 
since wanted to clarify the appropriate application of the internal relocation option, it 
has since started a life of its own, its dire consequences proving too difficult to rein in. 
 
While the internal relocation option was not envisioned at the time of the drafting of 
the Refugee Convention or indeed until around the 1980s when state policies regarding 
asylum were significantly more open, authorities in the field argue that the internal 
relocation option is consistent with international refugee law.24  This is because as 
Hathaway explains “international protection is designed to provide a back-up source of 
protection” or surrogate protection to persons seriously at risk.25 A refugee claims this 
international surrogate protection because her own state cannot or will not provide 
protection.26 A refugee can rely on this surrogate protection when she has shown that 
there is a lack of state protection. With the task of harmonising European Union policy 
on asylum, internal relocation has now also become codified in EU law in Art 8 of the 
Recast Qualification Directive.27 However, the EU approach to what they term internal 
protection alternative has been criticised as not conforming to international law.28 
 
The development of the doctrine in the UK has taken influences from both international 
jurisprudence as well as EU law. In the UK, internal relocation option developed 
through three main cases; Karanakaran29, Robinson30 and Januzi31. In Karanakaran, 
Sedley LJ explained that: 
“[…] in most cases, […], it is in relation to the asylum seeker’s ability or 
willingness to avail himself of his home State’s protection that the question of 
internal relocation arises. Because, however, unwillingness is explicitly related 
to the driving fear, it predicates a different set of considerations from inability, 
which may be indicated or contraindicated by a much wider range of factors.”32 
 
 
23 UNHCR: Position Paper on Relocating Internally as a Reasonable Alternative to Seeking Asylum 
(The So-Called "Internal Flight Alternative" or "Relocation Principle"), 9 February 1999, available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b336c.html (accessed 25.8.2013), para 13-14 and 15-17 
respectively. 
24 James C. Hathaway. “International Refugee Law: The Michigan Guidelines on the Internal 
Protection Alternative.” Michigan Journal of International Law 21 (1999) 131, 131. 
25 Hathaway and Foster,  “Chapter 6.1: Internal Protection/Relocation/Flight Alternative as an Aspect 
of Refugee Status Determination”, supra note 21, 358. 
26 Dallal Stevens: UK Asylum Law and Policy: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2004): 328. 
27 Recast Qualification Directive 2011/95/EV, 13 December 2011, available at http://www.ilga-
europe.org/home/issues/asylum_in_europe/monitoring_eu_asylum_law/the_recast_qualification_direct
ive_2011_95_eu (accessed 25.8.2013), p. 9. 
28 Hathaway and Foster, “Chapter 6.1: Internal Protection/Relocation/Flight Alternative as an Aspect of 
Refugee Status Determination”, supra note 21. For a comprehensive analysis of the Recast 
Qualification Directive and its critique, see John Eaton: “The Internal Protection Alternative Under 
European Union Law: Examining the Recast Qualification Directive” International Journal of Refugee 
Law 24: 4 (2012): 765. 
29 Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] EWCA Civ 11. 
30 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Robinson 
[1997] EWCA Civ 3090. 
31 Januzi (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 5. 
32 Ibid, LJ Stedley para 4.  
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In Robinson 33 , the Court of Appeal looked towards international jurisprudence in 
addressing the specific question of reasonableness of relocation. The Court was 
informed by the Canadian case Thirunavukkarasu where the question of “would be 
unduly harsh to expect this person to move to another less hostile part of the country?” 
was considered as part of the test to measure ‘reasonableness’ of the internal relocation 
option.34 Woolf LJ also enumerated various tests that had previously been applied 
within the UK context.35 Of note for the present purposes was the last question: “if the 
quality of the internal protection fails to meet basic norms of civil, political and socio-
economic human rights”, relocation was considered to be unavailable.36 This part of 
the test suits a position that Hathaway and Foster have argued for that the consideration 
should be firmly place on international human rights law standards. 
 
Hathaway and Foster argue for a shift towards “ “internal protection alternative” and 
reject the current UNHCR recommendation to analyse whether it is “reasonable” to 
require the claimant to avail herself to “safety” in the proposed internal destination in 
favour of a commitment to assess the sufficiency of protection which is accessible to 
the asylum seeker there”.37 Their analysis have been accepted by international refugee 
lawyers and have been coined the Michigan approach according to an international 
round table organised there.38 Reasonableness test is notoriously difficult to apply, 
lending itself to highly subjective interpretations. As such, Hathaway has criticised it 
as being “prone to arbitrariness”, “involving an unfocused and open-ended inquiry 
which is not anchored in the language or object” of the Refugee Convention. 39 
However, it is the Michigan approach, informed by international refugee law and 
international human rights law, which the House of Lords in Januzi outright reject. The 
House of Lords explicitly hold that reasonableness of internal relocation should not be 
evaluated on the basis of the place of relocation meeting civil, political and 
socioeconomic rights.40 According to Lord Bingham neither the Refugee Convention 
nor the Qualification Directives’ Article 8, requires a human rights approach as 
advanced by the Michigan approach.41 However, Lord Bingham is of the opinion that 
decisions should be guided by the UNHCR Guidelines, which do address “respect for 
human rights” and “economic survival”.42 In essence, then Lord Bingham advances a 
 
33 Robinson, supra note 30. 
34 Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), Canada: Federal Court, 10 
November 1993, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3deb87324.html (accessed 24.8.2013). 
35 “For example, (a) if as a practical matter (whether for financial, logistical or other good reason) the 
'safe' part of the country is not reasonably accessible; (b) if the claimant is required to encounter great 
physical danger in travelling there or staying there; (c) if he or she is required to undergo undue 
hardship in travelling there or staying there; (d) if the quality of the internal protection fails to meet 
basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic human rights.” In Robinson, supra note 30, para 18. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Hathaway and Foster, “Chapter 6.1: Internal Protection/Relocation/Flight Alternative as an Aspect of 
Refugee Status Determination”, supra note 21, 381. 
38  Michigan Guidelines. 
39 Hathaway and Foster, “Chapter 6.1: Internal Protection/Relocation/Flight Alternative as an Aspect of 
Refugee Status Determination”, supra note 21, 387. 
40 Eaton, “The Internal Protection Alternative Under European Union Law: Examining the Recast 
Qualification Directive”, supra note 28, p. 778. 
41 Januzi, supra note 31, paras 15-20. 
42 UNHCR. Guidelines on Internal Protection: “Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative” within the 
Context of Article 1 A (2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, 23 July 2003, UN Doc. HRC/GIP/03/04, paras 28-30. 
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position that instead of the Michigan approach’s non-discrimination principle 
Adjudicators should ask the question: ‘can the claimant live a “relatively normal life?”43  
 
Lord Bingham’s analysis illustrates some of the difficulties in advancing a human rights 
approach in the UK context. Reasonableness analysis, of course, forms one of the 
foundational principles within common law traditions. However, it is arguable that 
grounding the application of the internal relocation test to international human rights 
standards is more desirable. This is particularly the case in women asylum seeker’s 
cases where gender-based persecution is part of their claim. This is because human 
rights, if appropriately used, could provide a useful standard of measurement that is 
internationally recognised. In particular, advances made in the area of women’s rights 
could better inform decisions made on asylum seeker women’s claims. Arguably, it 
provides a less subjective test than how the reasonableness test has so far been applied 
which has discriminated against women. Undoubtedly, however, a human rights 
approach does not offer a panacea in refugee determination processes. There is always 
the additional problem of trying to make individual caseworkers at the first instance 
and adjudicators at the first-tier and appeal Tribunals to actually apply a certain 
approach. Even when the higher Courts have created additional criteria for the 
application of the internal relocation option they are not able to control how the criteria 
are ultimately applied by the decision-maker.44 Indeed, the Upper Tribunal has, as 
evidenced from the following cases, been extremely restrictive in their application of 
the internal relocation option.  
 
What is advanced here is a position that argues that an alternative reading is not only 
possible but also needed when considering the specific cases where internal relocation 
option has been used to deny refugee status for women fleeing gender-based 
persecution. It is argued here that the Tribunal has used their internal relocation option 
tests so restrictively that it places an unnecessarily high standard for the asylum seeker 
women to pass. The reasonableness analysis has been particularly susceptible to the 
Tribunals problematic views on the dichotomy of victimhood and agency that stem 
from their Eurocentric and male-centered perspective. It is finally suggested that an 
assessment of the relocation option, if not being able to be challenged, should be 
grounded in international human rights standards. If applied with gender sensitivity, it 
could improve the current state of the internal relocation option test. 
 
5. HC & RC (China) and Internal relocation  
 
HC & RC is a case involving a trafficked woman and her child from a rape. HC was 
born in the village of Nan Shan in Henei City in Anhui province in China where she 
was looked after by her grandmother between the ages of 6, when she was orphaned 
and 10, when her grandmother died. After her grandmothers’ death, HC left her home 
village and took a train and ended up in Sezhuan where she lived on the streets, 
scavenging for food and sometimes finding work. After moving to and working in a 
rural area as a domestic worker, she moved back to the city. For a few years, she moved 
around like this in search of work. 
 
 
43 Eaton, “The Internal Protection Alternative Under European Union Law: Examining the Recast 
Qualification Directive”, supra note 28, 778. 
44 Stevens, UK Asylum Law and Policy: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, supra note 26, 
329. 
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It was in 2005, at the age of 14 or 15 that she became involved in prostitution. She was 
employed washing dishes when she met a middle-aged woman who promised her well-
paid work. She did not know what the work involved. She went on a journey by minibus 
with this woman and two other young girls and arrived as a house. After a few days she 
was told she had to take clients, she was being forced to prostitution. She kept on saving 
money to try to escape. She paid an agent believing that he would help her escape, but 
he took her to Russia and locked her in, forcing her to prostitution again. After getting 
pregnant, she was told to leave and she flew to the UK. 
 
The case of HC & RC evidences some of the problematic reasoning found in women’s 
cases when adjudicators judge the “reasonableness” of the internal relocation option 
from a particular individualistic, Western male perspective. The Adjudicators are able 
to come to the conclusion that internal relocation option is possible for HC & RC, by a 
limited engagement with the risk of re-trafficking and lack of state protection and by 
viewing the ‘reasonableness’ of the internal relocation option from a narrow 
perspective that fails to engage meaningfully with the realities of the violations of her 
socio-economic rights. 
 
In HC & RC, the Adjudicators narrate her experiences through a simplistic vision of 
agency or lack thereof and evidence a failure to understand the nature of trafficking. 
This narrative has little to do with the economic realities, global inequalities, 
disenfranchisement and the ever increasing strictness with which State borders are 
policed that make up the major forces behind global trafficking in women. The 
portrayal of the traditional trafficking victim is echoed in the current international 
approaches to trafficking. The larger story of the evolving legal framework on 
trafficking has been problematic. As argued elsewhere, the official presentation follows 
the cinematic representation of trafficking as highly gendered and reproduces 
stereotypical narratives of femininity and masculinity.45 It is these larger narratives of 
victimization and criminalization that mask behind the very real global structural 
inequalities that produce the conditions for trafficking. 
 
But it is this stereotypical ideal of the “proper” victim that elicits the protection 
approach of the Western legal machinery. It is also the way in which HC’s story is told, 
through the simplistic binary of victimhood and agency. She is represented as young 
and “naïve” as she recounts not being aware that she would be forced into prostitution. 
The Home Office Presenting Officer (HOPO) argues that HC “when she was younger 
and more vulnerable she had not been abducted. She had ended up as a prostitute 
through naivety”.46 The implication seems to be that if she had been abducted, she 
would conform to the stereotypical image of trafficking victim, completely void of 
agency. HC, on the other hand, was just young and naïve. Although she might elicit 
some sympathy as an innocent victim, there is a possibility of overcoming. Now, after 
coming to the UK, after “growing up” HC, according to the HOPO, does not fit this 
mold anymore, as now “she is aware of the position, if it were to arise again”. 47 
According to the HOPO narrative, she now has agency, she now knows, and she would 
not consent to being trafficked again. Eventually, it is the adoption of this reductive 
 
45 Rutvica Andrijasevic: “Chapter 11: The Difference Borders Make: (Il)legality, Migration and 
Trafficking in Italy among Eastern European Women in Prostitution” in Uprootings/Regroundings: 
Questions of Home and Migration, Sara Ahmed et al.: (Oxford: Berg, 2003): 251- 271, at 265. 
46 HC & RC (China), para 36 
47 Ibid, para 36. 
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narrative based on the binary dichotomy of victimhood and agency that allows the 
Tribunal to reach the conclusion that she is not at risk of re-trafficking and that internal 
relocation option is available to her. The representation of HC’s experiences is 
thoroughly divorced from the economic, political and social realities that are central to 
her claim. 
  
It is this kind of reasoning that shows that the Adjudicators are assessing the viability 
of internal relocation from a very particularised individualistic and economically 
privileged Western position. It is as if the issue is as simple as moving house from 
Belfast to London for instance might be for them as privileged, white males. This 
reasoning ignores the multitude of factors that affect practical access to protection 
elsewhere in the country of origin. In reality, women face multiple issues including 
financial, social, linguistic, familial and logistical that affect their ability/inability to 
relocate to another part of the country of their origin. It is not enough for the 
Adjudicators to think that the persecution can be localised, the question needs to be a 
holistic assessment of whether there is any realistic likelihood of access to protection 
of their rights. 
 
Equally, in finding that HC & RC would not become destitute on return to China, the 
Adjudicators use very problematic reasoning. They seem to either not want or be 
capable of estimating the realities of a single mother in China. They mention that 
“Beijing is a city where single mothers clubs have been established”.48 But they provide 
no consideration of whether HC could actually access these clubs. There is no 
consideration on who has access to these clubs or what their costs are. The existence of 
support to some people is not enough if it is not meaningfully accessible to the person 
in question. The Adjudicators think that she can get domestic or agricultural work, but 
again do not consider how she will be able to get work and take care of her child at the 
same time as a single mother with no relatives in the country nor any economic 
resources of her own.  
 
The Adjudicators also brush aside the expert evidence that provides that she and her 
child are at a high risk of re- trafficking. The evidence from human rights NGOs were 
also ignored, even when they specifically addressed the lack of substantive protection 
from trafficking and exploitation of women “due to limited legislative definitions, 
administrative detention of prostitutes and policy execution.49 Even a United States 
States Department (USSD) Report was used in providing evidence for the lack of state 
protection, which stated that despite the general anti-corruption measures the PRC 
government “did not demonstrate concerted efforts to investigate and punish 
government officials specifically for complicity in trafficking”.50 Main deficiencies 
that the Report noted were in the area of victim care and protection and tackling 
trafficking for involuntary servitude or forced labour which, as the expert Dr Sheehan 
provided, were the precise areas on which HC and RC would rely for protection against 
re-trafficking.51 The USSD Report further stated that protection and rehabilitation for 
trafficking victims was modest and that protection services remained “temporarily 
inadequate to address victim’s needs”.52 
 
48 Ibid, para 91. 
49 Ibid, para 11. 
50 Ibid, para 15. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid, para 16. 
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The Adjudicators are able to sideline the evidence of a lack of protection of the rights 
of victims of trafficking by coming to the conclusion that she would just not consent to 
being re-trafficked. The economic disadvantage and the possibilities of destitution are 
not addressed adequately as the Adjudicators reason that she is in fact a “mere economic 
migrant”. The Adjudicators reasoned that since the she had been an orphan and had 
lived on the streets, she “had accumulated considerable experience of fending for 
herself”.53 This lead them to decide that she would be able to relocate and that even if 
she might “encounter economic difficulties”, she would not “be permitted to sink into 
destitution” as they consider she would be able to get some assistance from the All- 
China Women’s Federation.54 After all, the Tribunal reasons:  
“the humanitarian object of the Refugee Convention was to secure a reasonable 
measure of protection for those with a well-founded fear of persecution in their 
home country or some part of it; it was not to produce a general leveling-up of 
living standards around the world; desirable though of course that was”.55 
 
The expert evidence on the “severe discrimination and considerable long-term social 
and economic disadvantages” was overridden in a particularly noteworthy manner. The 
Tribunal considered a newspaper article of an interview of 6 single mothers in China. 
It stated that “It may very well be that she would encountered a degree of prejudice but, 
nonetheless, it is clear from the articles referring to the six single mothers mentioned 
above that, despite whatever prejudice they encountered, they were still pleased to have 
had their children, which demonstrates in our view that they had not encountered 
overwhelming prejudice”.56 It is not clear how the degree of a mother being pleased to 
have had her child demonstrates a correlation to the degree of societal prejudice. It is 
probably that many parents would be pleased to have had their children, no matter what 
society might say of them. In any case, reaching a decision about societal prejudice and 
discrimination, counter that of reputable human rights organisations and country expert 
evidence, based on such a newspaper article is trivial at best and outlandish at its worst.  
 
This is despite the concerns of the expert evidence that HC’s lack of family or social 
network and her poverty if returned to China would make her a likely target for 
traffickers. Dr Sheehan considered both “work and accommodation to be activities 
fraught with risk for a young woman alone”.57 Some people-traffickers would typically 
disguise as offers of legitimate work and/or accommodation. However cautious she 
might try to be she would remain “extremely vulnerable to the many fake employment 
agencies and training providers in China, which were actually fronts for people-
trafficking”.58 Because the only relatively safe way to find work in China wad to go on 
the recommendation of a family member or someone from the same home village or 
small town, something which the appellant did not have, she would have no choice but 
to go to exactly the kind of agencies that traffickers exploited.59 
 
 
53 Para 84. 
54 HC & RC (China), para 88. 
55 Ibid, para 89. 
56 Ibid, para 88. 
57 Ibid, para 18. 
58 Ibid, para 18. 
59 Ibid, para 19. 
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UNHCR Guidelines on Relocation note that internal relocation consideration should be 
a holistic exercise where the decision maker looks at the individual personal 
circumstances including past persecution or the fear of it, psychological and health 
condition, family and social situation and survival capacities. 60  In HC & RC, the 
Adjudicators, while not referring to the Guidelines, discuss each point and arrive at a 
restrictive view that invites criticism of selective use of evidence and purposeful 
exclusion. For instance, when considering her lack of family at place of relocation, it is 
not considered in the meaningful way in which the expert evidence for instance 
provides, ie. the discrimination and real difficulties faced by lone women without 
family networks. But rather, the Adjudicators use her lack of family to argue that since 
in their view the principal reason for discrimination against trafficked women was that 
their families had lost face, as the appellant has no family, “this principal cause of 
discrimination would not arise”. 61  This finding completely ignores the realities of 
structural discrimination, discrimination that is based on gender. 
 
The Adjudicators fail to recognise the real risk of violations of her socio-economic 
rights upon her return. The problem of not recognising systemic violations of economic 
and social rights, particularly in relation to women, is a reflection of a larger problem 
of international refugee law still seeming to consider civil and political rights’ 
violations as more important. It reflects the pervasiveness of the “traditional, single, 
male” refugee model. By privileging violations of civil and political rights, decision-
makers are at risk of discriminating against women asylum seekers, especially those 
persecuted by non-state actors. Recognition of social and economic rights necessitates 
an understanding of the context, which arguably in the case of HC & RC was repeatedly 
and decisively ignored. Such restrictive reasoning goes against the object and purpose 
of the Refugee Convention, to apply the Convention expansively so as to afford people 
the widest possible exercise of their rights without discrimination. 
 
6. FB (Sierra Leone) and Internal Relocation Option 
 
The reason why the internal relocation option assessment disproportionally affects 
women’s asylum cases is that it of particular issue when the persecutors are non-state 
actors. There is a presumption that if the persecution is by state actors, an assessment 
of internal relocation is not applicable. While this is the preferable presumption, it 
should not result into a situation where the converse thought to be the presumptive 
position where non-state actors are the persecutors. Much of the persecution of women 
is, indeed by non-state actors due to the unequal social, economic and political situation 
of women in societies. In such cases, the adjudicators need to make a decision on 
whether there is effective, accessible and practicable state protection or indeed whether 
the state of origin is unable or unwilling to offer protection to the asylum seeker. Too 
often, in women’s cases, the Adjudicators are fixated with localising the asylum seeker 
women’s harm. In these cases, the persecution by non-state actors is constructed as 
something solely private and therefore localised. 
 
 
60 UNHCR. Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the Context of 
Article 1 A (2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (May 
2002), UN Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01. Baroness Hale drew on these Guidelines in Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v K (FC) Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 45. 
61 Ibid, para 85. 
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FB was 16 years old from Sierra Leone when she arrived in the UK and claimed asylum. 
She lived in Bankala village with her parents and brothers. Her father had been killed 
in 1999 during the civil war. The appellant’s mother was a sowei, a leader of the 
Sande/Bondo women, (female) initiation societies, and one of the women who carried 
out the ritual circumcision of young girls. When FB was about 16, she underwent FGM. 
She spent about five days recovering in a nearby village during which time she was told 
that her mother had died and she was to replace her mother as a sowei. On her return to 
her village she told of her reluctance to the local chief but he insisted that she go through 
the rituals to become a sowei and after which she would become one of his wives. She 
refused this and fled. 
 
Initially, the Secretary of State refused her claim as he did not accept that her claim that 
she would be forced into become a sowei and would be forced to marry the local chief 
engaged the Refugee Convention. The Adjudicator rejected a risk of further FGM and 
thought it would not be unduly harsh for her to relocate. She applied to the IAT on the 
basis that the Adjudicator had made a series of legal errors. The application was 
dismissed on the basis that she was not a member of a particular social group, but on 
renewal, a reconsideration was ordered. Subsequently, her case turned on the finding 
on the availability of the internal relocation option. 
 
In FB, situating the harm she has suffered in the private sphere is essential to the finding 
of the availability of the internal relocation option. Amnesty reports cited as evidence 
showed how women’s civil, political, social and economic rights were being “violated 
on a daily basis” and that there was a  “a lack of formal protection” from the Sierra 
Leonean government.62 Indeed, the Tribunal accepts that she falls within one of the five 
enumerated Convention grounds of membership of a particular social group.63 
 
The problem for her is that the Adjudicators consider it “reasonable” for her to 
‘relocate’. FB, is symptomatic of cases, in which the UK approach to reasonableness 
of internal relocation have resulted into a consideration that is centered on the applicant 
rather than State actions (or omissions). This means that the availability of the internal 
relocation option tends to be assessed based on the resources and opportunities 
available for the asylum seeker rather than examination of the actions of the State or its 
obligations.64 This has led to Tribunals finding internal relocation option as being 
available even when that protection has not come from the State. For instance, in JM 
(Kenya), the Adjudicators decided that she could get protection from her “faith”.65 Even 
though, the Adjudicators undoubtedly meant the church community, this mention of 
the metaphysical shows the absurdity with which the Adjudicators decide cases when 
using the reasonableness test. International refugee law, however, focuses on the State 
and its lack of protection. There is nothing that justifies this reliance on other actors if 
the State is unwilling or unable to provide protection. It is the State which has the 
primary obligation to provide protection and the claimant should not be expected to 
 
62 Ibid, para 47. 
63 Ibid, paras 69-71. 
64 Siobhan Mullally: “Domestic Violence Asylum Claims and Recent Developments in International 
Human Rights Law: A Progress Narrative?” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 60:2 
(2011): 459, at 481. 
65 JM (Sufficiency of protection-IFA-FGM) Kenya [2005] UKIAT 00058. 
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seek protection from an entity that is not a legitimate or nominal government.66 There 
is a need to concentrate on State responsibility in order to avoid the restrictive and 
inappropriate use of the reasonableness test. 
 
Centering on the applicant, rather than the lack of state protection coupled with 
simplistic binary framing of agency versus victimhood, makes it very difficult for 
asylum seeker women’s complex experiences to be intelligible to the Tribunal. In FB, 
just as in HC & RC, her displaying of her agency and the Tribunal’s recognition of it 
makes them arrive at the decision that she is thus able to relocate. The Tribunal states: 
“whilst we would never wish to underestimate the vulnerability of young women in the 
position of the appellant, the appellant herself has shown both courage and resilience 
in facing her difficulties”.67 Furthermore, the Adjudicators noted that they took “into 
account the particular skills that she had developed in the UK and the courage and 
resourcefulness she has displayed in coming here”.68 Insinuating that since she has 
managed to come to the UK, she is equally as able to relocate to another part of her 
country of origin. With respect to the binary notions of victimhood and agency, there 
seems to be no successful position to take here. Within this narrative, the asylum seeker 
cannot be at the same time vulnerable and have agency- this complexity is not 
intelligible to the decision-making process.  
 
The Tribunal considers that it would not be unduly harsh to relocate to Freetown “partly 
because it is a cosmopolitan urban environment where the rural chiefs do not have so 
great an influence and where state authority is more evident”.69  Again, the Tribunal 
does not take seriously the extensive evidence from Human Rights Watch and other 
Country reports in the case, which demonstrated the lack of state protection for gender- 
based violence throughout Sierra Leone. FB had two children in the UK and is being 
sent back as a single mother with 2 children with no family connections nor prospects 
of employment. This is something which is considered in her evidence, but does not 
seemed to have made a difference to the final decision. 
 
Similarly to HC & RC, the Adjudicators can arrive at this decision by looking at the 
persecution narrowly. By containing the non-state persecution within the private 
sphere, the Adjudicators are able to speculate that FB could relocate to another part of 
Sierra Leone because the man she was being forced to marry was over 70 at the time 
and “might” be dead already.70 In these situations the complicity of the State is not 
analysed in any meaningful way. The women are private subjects, constituted only 
through their relationship with these old men that “might” be dead already or in the 
case of HC & RC, through her relationship with the trafficker who would not find her 
anymore. Conversely, these women are not subjects as themselves and in relation to 
their State, which is unable or unwilling to offer their rights protection. This portrayal 
ultimately has the consequence of delegitimising these asylum seeker women’s cases. 
While it fits government policy, it produces discriminatory outcomes. 
 
 
 
66 Ninette Kelley: “Internal Flight/Relocation/Protection Alternative: Is it Reasonable?” International 
Journal of Refugee Law 14:1 (2002): 4, at 24. 
67 Ibid, p. 34 
68 Ibid, p. 36 
69 Para 76. 
70 Similar reasoning was used by Adjudicators in MD (Ivory Coast) CG [2010] UKUT 215 (IAT). 
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7. Conclusion  
 
In 2011, on the anniversary of the Refugee Convention, the CEDAW Committee 
adopted a statement that called for gender equality for refugees. It stated that the 
CEDAW Committee “calls on States to recognise gender related forms of persecution 
and to interpret the ‘membership of a particular social group’71 ground of the 1951 
Convention to apply to women. Gender sensitive registration, reception, interview and 
adjudication processes also need to be in place to ensure women’s equal access to 
asylum”.72 The CEDAW Committee recognises that it is not only the interpretation of 
the Refugee Convention but gender-sensitive adjudication processes that are necessary 
for the protection of the rights of asylum seeker women. 
 
A human rights approach, in and of itself, is undoubtedly not free from difficulties of 
application as in the case of the ‘reasonableness test’ in internal relocation assessments. 
However, when it comes to women’s rights, a human rights approach that takes into 
account the feminist critiques is the preferable approach. The discriminatory effects of 
the current assessment of the internal relocation option in women’s refugee status 
determination process must be challenged. The concerns of the disproportionate effect 
on women of the hierarchisation of human rights and the public/private divide that 
enables greater impunity of women’s harm needs to be taken seriously. By doing this 
we can hope to contribute to conversations that expose the ways in which the 
application of the internal relocation option has provided another means by which to 
restrict the movement of people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71 UNHCR Executive Committee recommended this already in 1985; See Executive Committee 
Conclusion No. 39 (XXXXVI)- 1985 on Refugee Women and International Protection, 18 October 
1985, para K 
72 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), CEDAW 
Statement on the Anniversaries of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1961 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 19 October 2011, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ea13f012.html [accessed 17 March 2014] 
